Consolidation Loans for really Bad Credit

But Brexit will hurt a woman the most.

Last Wednesday I autographed an open memorandum organised by the anti-Brexit Women for a People's Poll campagne. Theresa May was asked to give us a last word on the Brexit transaction. In the run-up to the 2016 referenda, we were pledged a "Brexit dividend" of 350 million pounds per annum for the national healthcare system.

This was a smart falsehood that was particularly appealing to females, who make up 77% of the NHS population. Nobody's mentioning a Brexite dividends now. It is a catastrophe for everyone, but the Ministry of Health itself acknowledges that it will affect especially badly female people.

When the state cannot or will not, the story shows that it is females who have to fill the gap - and this will lead to females having to cut their paychecks. Not only will this make poverty worse for poor mothers, it will also affect the business world as the state will lose important revenue taxes.

In view of the difficult state of feminine representativeness in the Brexit negotiations, it is perhaps not surprising that May's agreement has nothing to say about all this. However, this does not mean that it is okay, and it does not mean that it must be accepted by it. Which brings me to my last ground for signature of the letter:

However, the best she can do with a horrible gesture is still a horrible business for woman - and since they have been barred from the start of the dispute, woman now deserves a say. A recent YouGov survey showed that 62% of female citizens want a vote on the definitive agreement in May.

Now, the will of the electorate is clearly that we put their Brexit deals to the ball.

Italy's fiscal imbalance case

Regarding the Italy budgetary stalemate, the European Commission and the European Union are still in a stalemate. Italy has fiscal and expenditure agendas that are now seen as one of the major issues for the functioning of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It opens a whole new window on European policy risks.

It is estimated that these policies will in 2019 account for 2.4% of Italy's GNP (down to 2.1% in 2020), contrary to the EMU financial policy framework. The same applies to the IMF's more cautious forecast for Italy in comparison with the OECD, the European Commission and the Italians.

Further IMF support for tax attention is not good news as far as the domestic authorities are concerned. That is what Paul De Grauwe describes as a "harsher" budgetary restriction for EMU Member States. An important aspect from the point of views of deficits expenditure and its policy support is the global / creditworthiness aspect.

As far as the EU tax criterion is concerned, however, it is only a question of sovereign indebtedness. In recent month, Reuters' Abhinav Ramnarayan and Ritvik Carvalho have been discussing how the spread figures between 10-year Irish sovereign bond and the Federal Republic of Germany show that Italy is gradually being pooled alongside Greece and not Spain and Portugal, which show little infectious effect.

What "policy" is there in the EMU tax regulations? In the first place, the present administration cannot be concerned about the actual cost if it skips the opportunity for cancellation, as the burdens are on prospective tax payers and administrations and there is an inducement to pass these burdens on to prospective generation.

Historically, the issue has not been considered reliable: i.e. EMU zero no rescue action clauses were just "not credible" when a large nation like Italy got into difficulties. Today, in the lack of tax and policy units as in the US, the nation is faced with a tough budgetary restraint because things are different now.

Past experience has shown that no plausible methods of imposing penalties on supranational countries have been adopted (e.g. Germany and France 2004/05). In addition, the subprime mortgage turmoil has prompted important reform of the EU regulatory architecture, among them a Banking Union for Europe, which has not yet been finalised (but is likely to be finalised by 2026). There is a risk that (business) trust will be adversely affected, leading on the whole to a downward trend in tax growth.

Five current choices exist for the case of Italy. If the ESM becomes involved, as Peter Praet of the ECB recently announced, the nation will in any case have to take corrective action (structural measures) that overlay the domestic policy culture. Lastly, the last alternative would be to recognise that this policy disconnection emphasises something else which requires further opening at EU (or EMU) levels.

Many have stressed that democracy cannot be expected to be at the same footing as within national states: the latter redistribute 40-50 per cent of GDP, while the EU purse accounts for only 1 per cent of GDP. Early last year, the overwhelming Italian minority voiced dissatisfaction with the EU's response to the crisis of refugees and the economic situation.

There is a need to address the poorly framed budget in Italy and there is also a general need to take into account the rationale that the EU now has tighter budget regulations (including the semi-automatic EDP penalties enforced by a reverse majority). At the same token, this would necessitate more full risk-sharing commitments at EMU by means of an express tax treaty.